GusDur.Net - 2009 - The Enemy Within

The Enemy Within

Sumber foto: https://www.ajnn.net/news/aldi-dan-nasionalisme-indonesia/index.html

By Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid

The book you are reading is the result of over two years’ research conducted by LibForAll Foundation, a non-governmental organization inspired by Indonesia’s rich traditions and culture, and whose mission is to encourage the growth of peaceful, free and tolerant societies throughout the world. I established LibForAll Foundation in 2003 with American businessman and author C. Holland Taylor, and serve as a member of its board of directors and as an advisor, along with Kyai Haji A. Mustofa Bisri, Prof. Dr. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Prof. Dr. M. Amin Abdullah, Prof. Dr. Azyumardi Azra, Prof. Dr. Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd, Shaykh Musa Admani, Prof. Dr. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Dr. Sukardi Rinakit, and Father Franz Magnis-Suseno, S.J. In addition, the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar University in Cairo—Sayyid Muhammad Tantawi—expressed his desire to advise LibForAll Foundation in its efforts to present Islam as a blessing for all creation (rahmatan lil-‘âlamîn), during the visit of LibForAll CEO C. Holland Taylor to Egypt in May of 2008. And in reality, those whose hearts are filled with sincerity and goodwill, and who strongly embrace efforts to achieve peace, freedom and tolerance, are, in a cultural sense, members of LibForAll Foundation’s global family.

To accomplish its mission, LibForAll Foundation employs a spiritual approach, to raise individual and social consciousness and thereby transform individuals and society for the better. This approach is predicated upon the fact that the innate struggle between the spiritual (higher) and animalistic (base) natures of humanity exerts a major impact upon the external world. The tension between spiritual and carnal impulses frequently ignites conflict, within both individuals and society at large. In this context, it is vital that we contemplate what the noble Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, told his companions following their triumph in the battle of Badr: “Raja‘nâ min jihâd al-ashghar ilâ jihâd al-akbar” (“We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater”).1 Hearing his words, the companions were surprised. They asked, “What kind of war (qitâl) could possibly be greater than the one we just fought, against overwhelming odds?” When the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, replied, “the war against one’s own carnal nature,” his companions fell silent, recognizing how difficult it is to overcome this enemy within. Besides being difficult to identify, the struggle against internal enemies requires tenacity and emotional steadfastness, since base and carnal impulses constitute an inseparable part of every human being.

Base instincts are a powerful force which always harbor a destructive potential, rendering individuals discontented and incapable of experiencing peace. Islamic scholars often compare this lust (for power, wealth, sexual satisfaction, etc.) to a wild beast. Whoever succeeds in taming his carnal nature achieves inner peace, and can employ his vital energies to achieve far-reaching, lofty and noble goals. On the other hand, whoever is still dominated by egotism and lust is in a state of constant, restless anxiety/desire, and is a danger to himself and others.

From this perspective, there are two categories of human beings: First, those who have tamed their carnal nature, and act in a manner beneficial to others and to society at large. These calm and peaceful souls (al-nafs al-muthmainnah) are the embodiment of spirituality: the true vice-regents of God on earth (i.e., caliphs). Within the context of the ancient Mahabarata epic, these are the Pandavas. Second, those who are dominated by egotism and various forms of lust, and are thus a source of constant dissension, creating problems for others and society at large. These discontented souls (al-nafs al-lawwâmah) give rise to countless social upheavals and strife, and represent the embodiment of selfish lust. They are the true polytheists.2 Within the context of the Mahabarata, they are the Kuravas.3 These two types of people are present, in varying degrees, in our every day lives and at every social and economic level of society—local, national, and international; and in the realms of education, religion, business and politics.

In reality, this conflict between tranquil and discontented souls informs and colors the history of every corner of the earth, including the struggle between the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, and the infidels/polytheists in the Hijaz. Yet one thing unique about Nusantara (the East Indies) is that every time this epic struggle has repeated itself, since the days of our ancient ancestors, the spiritual teachings and sublime values of tranquil souls have emerged triumphant in our beloved archipelago. For example, Mpu Tantular’s principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (“Oneness Amid Diversity”) has inspired the rulers of these islands from Hindu-Buddhist times until the present; and the Muslim saint and mystic Sunan Kalijogo—who is famed for having accommodated local traditions—taught indigenous rulers a peaceful, tolerant and spiritual understanding of Islam. Through his disciples, including Sultan Adiwijoyo, Juru Martani and Senopati ing Alogo, Sunan Kalijogo succeeded in rescuing and preserving these sublime values which, thanks to his efforts, we can still enjoy today.5

In the history of modern Indonesia, we also witness the presence of tranquil souls (al-nafs al-muthmainnah) during the birth and evolution of our national awareness—especially in the dialogue between Islam and Indonesian nationalism. In fact, not many people know about one of the key factors in the conceptual development of Indonesian nationalism.6 In 1919, three cousins began intensive weekly discussions concerning the relationship between Islam, as a set of religious teachings, and nationalism. They were H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, Kyai Haji Hasjim Asy‘ari7 and Kyai Haji Wahab Chasbullah. In addition, the future son-in-law of Tjokroaminoto, Sukarno—who at the time was just 18 years old—was soon actively involved in the weekly meetings, which occurred for many years. This national awareness was inherited by the following generation, including such figures as Abdul Wahid Hasjim (the son of Kyai Haji Hasjim Asy‘ari), Kyai Haji Kahar Muzakkir from Yogyakarta (a leading Muhammadiyah figure), and Haji Ahmad Djoyo Sugito.

During a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) congress held in Banjarmasin, Borneo in 1935, the NU decided not to support the formation of an Islamic state. Rather, it urged Muslims to practice Islamic teachings, so as to establish a truly islamic (i.e., virtuous and enlightened) populace within the framework of a pluralistic nation state. Ten years later, East Indies Muslim leaders who were involved in the Independence struggle accepted the concept of a Pancasila state presented by Sukarno, as did most heads of Islamic organizations at the time.8 Based upon a concept of nationality enriched by the religious and cultural values of our people, on 17 August 1945 Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesia’s independence in the name of its people, establishing a nation whose basic constitution and state ideology acknowledge and protect the traditions of cultural and religious pluralism that have long been integral to the lives of Indonesia’s inhabitants.

The idea to create this Pancasila nation state [as opposed to an explicitly Islamic state] was the fruit of bitter experience garnered from the history of the East Indies archipelago itself. On the one hand, the long history of the East Indies—which has given birth to many great Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic civilizations, during the Sriwijaya, Sailendra, first Mataram, Kediri, Singosari, Majapahit, Demak, Aceh, Makasar, Goa, second Mataram and other kingdoms—has created a strong awareness of the need to preserve the rich and diverse culture and traditions of our people. On the other hand, the continuous dialogue between Islam as a system of religious teachings, and nationalism—which dialogue is deeply rooted in the experience of the Indonesian people—strengthened our founders’ awareness that a nation state which accepts and protects the diverse beliefs, cultures and traditions of Indonesia represents the best foundation upon which to build the life of our nation and people. Mpu Tantular’s saying (“Oneness Amid Diversity”), the teachings and religious-cultural-political movement led by Sunan Kalijogo, as well as other such examples, aptly express the profound spiritual awareness which ultimately became the foundation of modern Indonesia, and has preserved it from disintegration since the proclamation of independence in 1945.

This was not an easy process, given the fluctuating relationships that have occurred between religion and nationalism. The difficulties which have arisen constitute historical facts that we must recognize and understand. A number of periods in the history of the East Indies are drenched in blood because of conflicts that occurred, often in the name of religion. Muslim religious scholars such as Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Kyai Haji A. Kahar Muzakkir, Haji Agus Salim, Kyai Haji A. Wahid Hasjim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimejo, Teuku Mohammad Hassan, and other founders of Indonesia, understood that the country they struggled to create and defend was not based upon a single religion, but instead was a nation state which acknowledged and protected all the various religions, cultures and traditions that have always been an integral part of life for the people of Indonesia.

Our founding fathers recognized that Pancasila does not contain a single principle that conflicts with religious teachings. On the contrary, its principles reflect the highest values of all religions, including that which, in Islam, is known as maqâshid al-sharî‘ah, (the purpose of shari‘a) namely, the common good (al-mashlahat al-‘âmmah). With this insight and awareness, Indonesia’s founders renounced the formal establishment of religion, and instead emphasized its spiritual essence. They positioned the state as an institution which acknowledges pluralism, protects all interests, and guards all beliefs, cultures and traditions within Indonesian society. In other words, they instituted Pancasila so as to foster religion as the manifestation of God’s blessing for all creation (rahmatan lil-‘âlamîn) in its true sense. In the idealized context of Pancasila, everyone may assist everyone else in achieving worldly prosperity; and everyone is free to worship in whatever way he or she considers best suited to attain eternal prosperity in the hereafter, without sacrificing the former.

As previously mentioned, there has been a fluctuating relationship between religion (i.e., Islam) and nationalism (Pancasila) throughout the history of Indonesia as a nation state. There have been groups that sought to establish an Islamic state through constitutional means (e.g., the 1950s’ Constitutional Assembly), and others through force of arms (such as Darul Islam/TII).9 And yet the majority of Indonesians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, have always agreed with Pancasila and struggled to realize the vision of our founding fathers. This tumultuous history provides invaluable lessons concerning how to build our nation state. The behavior of mass religious organizations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as nationalist political parties—all of which strongly affirm that the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (which rejected the establishment of an Islamic state), represent the final form and consensus for the building of our nation state—does not represent opportunistic political behavior, but rather, a mature and genuine awareness based on historical reality, the culture and traditions of our people, and the substance of religious teachings of whose truth we are certain.

This nationalistic approach serves to assure our nation’s future, so that developments will remain consistent with our own culture and traditions, as well as with the substantive teachings of the various religions which have long been an integral part of Indonesian national life. The stand adopted by nationalist-religious figures, who have struggled to maintain the structure of our national unity based on Pancasila and the Basic Constitution of 1945 (UUD 1945), may be likened to the incarnation of tranquil souls (al-nafs al-muthmainnah)—individuals who constantly seek to assist others, regardless of any difference in their religious or cultural beliefs. In doing so, they ardently strive to share God’s infinite love and compassion (rahmat) with all sentient beings.

Such behavior is not reflected in various mass organizations and political parties that have appeared in Indonesia since shortly before, and after, the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime. These new organizations remind us of the Darul Islam (DI) movement since, like DI, they seek to transform Indonesia into an explicitly religious state, replacing the state ideology of Pancasila with their own version of Islam, or even to eliminate NKRI and replace it with an Islamic caliphate.

Concerning the implicit claim of hardline activists that they completely understand the meaning of holy scripture and are therefore entitled to become God’s vice-regents (caliphs) and rule this world, compelling others to follow their “perfect” understanding—this claim is totally unacceptable and must be rejected, both theologically and politically. The extremists are correct that power belongs to God alone (lâ hukm illâ li Allâh), but not a single human being completely grasps or comprehends God’s power. That is why the Prophet once said, “You do not understand what is truly God’s law.”10 In brief, although based upon the Qur’an and Sunnah, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)—which extremists generally cite, to theologically justify their rule—is actually the product of human understanding and efforts which are constrained by time, place and the respective abilities of the fiqh authors of such jurisprudential texts.

Unaware of these facts, or consciously disregarding them for the sake of power, hardline activists are striving to transform Islam from a religion into an ideology. In their hands, Islam becomes a weapon to attack and discredit anyone who holds political views or religious beliefs different from their own. In other words, their call to “struggle for Islam” masks the reality that they are in fact struggling for a specific political agenda, and employing Islam as a lethal weapon to advance their worldly ambitions. This strategy is highly effective, since anyone opposing them can be accused of being an enemy of Islam itself, even when such statements are blatently false.

Under the pretext of “promoting and defending” Islam, extremists are simultaneously hard at work to displace expressions of local culture and tradition that form an integral part of Indonesians’ daily lives. They wish to replace these with foreign culture and traditions from the Middle East—especially Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood practices—due to their inability to distinguish between religion and the culture of the land in which Islam was revealed. The extremists adopt a harsh and violent demeanor, and refuse to compromise with other viewpoints—as if Islam had no tradition or command to create peace (islah), but rather, merely commanded its followers to employ compulsion and violence. Because of such attitudes and behavior, Islamist radicals are frequently referred to as “hardliners.”11

We must be aware that whenever Islam is transformed into an ideology, it becomes narrow and restricted, constrained by ideological limits and political platforms. Any contrary view of Islam, not to mention those that directly conflict with the extremists’ narrow understanding, will readily be cast as inimical to Islam itself, because the fundamental nature of an ideologically-driven interpretation of Islam is to eliminate opposition and justify political supremacy and power. It is in this context that extremists often accuse their opponents of being infidels and/or apostates. This transformation of Islam into an ideology clearly amputates, and emasculates, the supreme teachings of Islam, by attempting to stuff a religion that embodies compassion and tolerance into a narrow and rigid ideological framework.

In general, the aspirations of hardline movements in Indonesia—especially those that have a Wahhabi or Muslim Brotherhood view of Islam, or a mixture of the two—are strongly influenced by transnational Islamist movements from the Middle East. Indonesian extremist movements, including political parties, thus pursue an agenda that differs markedly from those of moderate Islamic mass organizations such as the Muhammadiyah, NU and nationalist political parties. Since their appearance after the fall of Suharto, extremist movements have begun to succeed in changing the face of Indonesian Islam to become more aggressive, furious, intolerant and full of hate.12 This, despite the fact that Indonesian Islam has long been known as gentle, tolerant and peace-loving (the international magazine Newsweek once called it “Islam with a smiling face”).

Hardliners seek to obtain the sympathy and support of Muslims by employing jargon which claims to promote and defend Islam; by using the subterfuge of “Islamic” education; and through what they call da‘wa amar ma’rûf nahyi munkar (proselytism by commanding the good deed and forbidding evil). Such rhetoric misleads even those who are highly educated in the modern sense of that term, but unaccustomed to thinking about spirituality and the essence of Islamic teachings. Such people are easily hooked by extremists, since they may be fascinated and attracted by the hardliners’ use of religious symbols.13 In fact, the extremists themselves “grasp” Islam without comprehending the essence of its teachings, as understood by saints, religious scholars and Indonesia’s founding fathers. Their understanding of Islam is framed by narrow ideological definitions and political agendas, which render them incapable of grasping any truth that is opposed to their narrow viewpoint, literal interpretation and/or political agenda. This inability to comprehend the truth drives them to accuse anyone who holds a different view of Islam, or does not support their agenda, of being an infidel or apostate.

With regard to rank and file extremists, many people associate with and support radical movements because they’re genuninely attracted to, and fascinated by, the religious symbols bandied about by extremist leaders. On the other hand, there are those who deliberately mobilize and manipulate the public by shouting religious formulae, when their actual goal is to satisfy their own egotistical and materialistic agenda. In order to short-circuit this process of radicalization, we must strive to encourage and inspire the public to be humble, to constantly raise their level of knowledge about Islam and to be open-minded, so that they may understand the spirituality and essence of Islamic teachings, and themselves become tranquil souls.

In addition, we must realize—as a nation—that what hardline activists are doing, and seeking to accomplish, not only conflicts with and threatens Pancasila and the Basic Constitution of 1945, but may ultimately destroy the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Anarchistic actions, proclaiming others to be infidels and/or apostates, and other forms of character assassination in which extremists often engage, are in reality attempts to destroy our national unity.

I have often been accused of being an infidel or apostate, but remain tranquil in the face of such baseless accusations. Extremist movements measure the truth of religious understanding in terms of ideology and politics, while we [traditional Muslims] base our understanding and practice of religion on an enthusiasm for love, mercy and compassion, and a spirituality that leaves one open to all sentient beings. We who produced this study/report base our Islamic teachings on the understanding of ahlussunnah wal-jamâ‘ah, the great traditions of Sunni Islam, while radicals have inherited the extreme practices of the Khawârij,14 who blithely condemned all who disagreed with them as infidels and apostates—an evil and corrupt practice that is still propagated today by many Wahhabis and their accomplices.15

Because hardline movements consider every Muslim who is different from them as less Islamic, or even an infidel or apostate, they are engaged in systematically infiltrating mosques, institutes, educational establishments, government, businesses, and moderate Islamic mass organizations, especially the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), in order to transform the various institutions of Indonesian society, and Islam itself, into their own harsh and rigid likeness. The extremists claim to be promoting and defending Islam, yet what they actually promote and defend is a narrow understanding of Islam trapped within the boundaries of their own political platform and ideology, not Islam itself. They are engaged in strenuous efforts to seize control of the Muhammadiyah and NU, because these two powerful organizations have more followers than any other Islamic mass organization, either in Indonesia or the world. In addition, these hardline groups regard the Muhammadiyah and NU as the primary obstacles in the path of achieving their political agenda, because both have long promoted the essence of Islamic values while rejecting the formalization of Islam through the establishment of an Islamic state, or the implementation of shari‘a as positive law.

Extremist infiltration has already provoked a great deal of upheaval within both of the afore-mentioned Islamic mass organizations. In this context, we recall the never-ending struggle that occurs within human beings themselves, and society at large (insân shaghîr), i.e., the struggle between tranquil souls (al-nafs al-muth mainnah) and those that are selfish and discontented (al-nafs al-lawwâmah), or the struggle between the Pandavas and Kuravas, which lies at the heart of the Mahabarata. While the former strive to create peace and tranquility for all, the latter constantly give rise to trouble and disturbances for others.

Transnational extremist movements and their accomplices in Indonesia have long been engaged in infiltration of the Muhammadiyah. This came to a head at the July, 2005 Muhammadiyah Congress in Malang, East Java, when extremist agents, including PKS and Hizb ut-Tahrir cadres,16 dominated many forums and succeeded in having a number of hardline movement sympathizers elected to the Muhammadiyah’s central board. But it was only after Professor Abdul Munir Mulkhan visited his native village of Sendang Ayu in Lampung Province, Sumatra, that the problem of radical infiltration of the Muhammadiyah grew into a major controversy, whose ramifications were observed even at an international level.17

A Muhammadiyah mosque in the small, remote village of Sendang Ayu, which had long been calm and tranquil, was suddenly thrown into chaos when a visiting PKS activist (in the form of an itinerant imam) introduced political issues into the mosque—defaming other organizations, including the Muhammadiyah itself— and began denouncing his opponents as infidels. When Professor Munir visited Sendang Ayu to celebrate the end of Ramadan with his mother and other relatives, he took the opportunity to explain to his fellow villagers the Muhammadiyah way of addressing differences of opinion, without questioning others’ faithfulness. As a result, the villagers no longer allowed PKS members to deliver sermons in their mosque. Dr. Munir subsequently described his experience, and expressed his wider concern, in Suara Muhammadiyah (The Voice of Muhammadiyah), the organization’s official magazine.18 This article evoked a serious discussion within the Muhammadiyah about extremist infiltration of the organization that had already occurred in many regions of Indonesia, using methods both subtle and blunt, even to the point of force.

Professor Munir’s article inspired Farid Setiawan—General Chairman of the Regional Board of Directors of the Muhammadiyah Student Movement, in the province of Yogyakarta—to discuss radical infiltration of the Muhammadiyah more widely, in two articles that also appeared in Suara Muhammadiyah. In the first, “Ahmad Dahlan [founder of the Muhammadiyah] in Tears (Reflections on the Writing of Abdul Munir Mulkhan),”19 Farid advised the Muhammadiyah to immediately amputate the extremist “virus” which, in his opinion, had already reached the critical stage of a category 4 cancer. He warned that if moderate Muhammadiyah members remained silent, “it’s entirely possible that the Muhammadiyah will not outlive its current leadership. And it’s also possible that if Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan could rise from his tomb, he would be shocked and in tears seeing the condition of the Muhammadiyah’s membership and cadres,”20 which are in the process of being taken over by extremist movements.

In the second article, “Three Actions (to Improve the Muhammadiyah’s) Male and Female Teachers Schools,” Farid wrote that “the ‘Tarbiyah virus’21 produces cadres who have an extreme and radical understanding of Islam. And the systematic effort to produce such cadres has already spread far and wide in the Muhammadiyah. This phenomenon has led to great disappointment among the Muhammadiyah’s leadership and wider family. The sons and daughters who, they hoped, would drive the Muhammadiyah’s future developments have, in fact, been transformed into enemies of the Muhammadiyah itself.”22

Recognizing just how far this Tarbiyah virus had infiltrated the Muhammadiyah, Farid recommended three steps to save the organization from extremist domination. First, to dissolve the schools which train Muhammadiyah cadres, because these have already been thoroughly corrupted by the Tarbiyah virus; second, to discard the system and curriculum employed in these schools, and expel all Muhammadiyah leaders and teachers who are involved in non-Muhammadiyah ideological movements and political agendas; and third, to re-energize all autonomous organizations within the Muhammadiyah movement.23

Munir’s and Farid’s articles provoked a bitter controversy and polemic between Muhammadiyah leaders who agreed with their criticisms, and those who did not. A primary concern of those who did agree was that the Muhammadiyah’s institutions, facilities, membership and resources were being used by extremist movements to promote the interests and goals of groups other than the Muhammadiyah. In the midst of this heated polemic concerning the Tarbiyah virus, a member of the Muhammadiyah’s central board, Dr. Haedar Nashir, clarified the various issues in a thin book entitled Manifestations of the Tarbiyah Movement: How Should the Muhammadiyah Respond?24

Less than three months after the book’s publication, the Muhammadiyah’s central board issued Muhammadiyah Central Board Decree Number 149/Kep/I.0/B/2006, in order to “rescue the Muhammadiyah from various activities that are damaging the organization” and free it “from the influence, mission, infiltration and interests of a political party which is engaged in religious proselytizing, and (thus flies on) the wings of da‘wa (religious proselytism),” because said party is exploiting the Muhammadiyah to achieve its own political goals, which conflict with the supreme vision and mission of the Muhammadiyah as a moderate Islamic organization:

“The Muhammadiyah has a right to be respected by others, and to be free of all agendas, interference and influence by other parties which may disrupt the unity and progress of its movement” (Preamble, Point 4). “All Muhammadiyah members need to be aware, understand and adopt a critical attitude which recognizes that every political party in this nation—including those that claim to represent ‘da‘wa’ or Islamic proselytism activities, such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)—are in fact mere political parties. Every political party is focused on the acquisition of political power. For that reason, in dealing with any political party, we must always remain committed to the true Path of the Muhammadiyah and must free ourselves from, and never engage ourselves with, the mission, interests, activities or goals of the above-mentioned political parties (Decree, Point 3).25

The issuance of this decree is understandable, because in fact the PKS does not merely “provoke problems and conflict within other Islamic organizations, including the Muhammadiyah,”26 but according to political experts, represents a greater threat than [the terrorist group] Jemaah Islamiyah to Pancasila, the Basic Constitution of 1945 and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In the words of Sadanand Dhume, an expert on Indone sian politics and extremist movements:

Despite the Justice Party’s social work, little separates its thinking from Jemaah Islamiyah’s. Like Jemaah Islamiyah, in its founding manifesto, the Justice Party called for the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Like Jemaah Is lamiyah, it has placed secrecy—facilitated by the cell structure both groups borrowed from the Brotherhood—at the heart of its organisation. Both offer a selective vision of modernity—one in which global science and technology are welcome, but un-Islamic values are shunned. The two groups differ chiefly in their methods: Jemaah Islamiyah is revolutionary; the Justice Party is evolutionary.

Of the two, the Justice Party is by far the larger threat to Indonesia. With its suicide bombings Jemaah Islamiyah has set itself up for a confrontation with the government that it cannot hope to win. In contrast, the Justice Party uses its position in parliament and its metastasizing network of cadres to advance the same goals incrementally, one vote at a time…. Ultimately, Indonesians alone will decide whether their future lies with the rest of Southeast Asia, or with a backward-looking movement cloaked in religious fundamentalism. The Justice Party remains on the march. How far it goes may well determine Indonesia’s future.27

As demonstrated by the research published in this book, although the Muhammadiyah central board’s Decree was issued in December of 2006, it has not been effectively implemented to this date. Transnational Islamist movements (Wahhabi, Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir) and their Indonesian accomplices have succeeded in deeply infiltrating the Muhammadiyah, and establishing alliances with other radicals who have long found harbor inside the organization itself. Both groups are actively recruiting other Muhammadiyah leaders and members to follow their extreme ideology, as occurred when the entire leadership of the Bantul branch of Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, the Muhammadiyah women’s movement, joined the PKS en masse.

While Farid Setiawan expressed concern that the Muhammadiyah might not outlive its current leadership, extremist organizations are busy attempting to seize control of the Muhammadiyah and employ it as a vehicle to achieve their goals in Indonesia for countless years to come. Many moderate Muhammadiyah figures are worried that extremists may dominate the next Muhammadiyah Congress in 2010, because radical activists within the Muhammadiyah have become progressively more strong and numerous.

Precisely because of this increasingly deep infiltration, moderate Muhammadiyah leaders regard the situation as profoundly dangerous, both for the Muhammadiyah itself and the Indonesian nation. In confronting such problems, wherever they exist, we must be honest, transparent and direct, so that our actions may serve to educate all Muslims, helping them to become mature in their faith and good citizens.

One finding which shocked those engaged in the field research component of this study was the phenomenon of dual membership, especially between the Muhammadiyah and extremist movements. In fact, the field research team estimated that up to 75% of the radical leaders interviewed for this study had ties with the Muhammadiyah.

Besides the Muhammadiyah, extremist infiltration of the Nahdlatul Ulama is also systematically underway. The strategic function of mosques within Muslim society leads radical groups to constantly attempt to seize control of them, using every possible method, including many which no one could possibly imagine other than the infiltrators themselves. Kyai Haji Mu’adz Thahir, Regional Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Pati, Central Java, informed our researchers that radicals were successfully infiltrating NU mosques in his area using the stratagem of providing a free cleaning service.

According to Kyai Thahir, the process works as follows: at first, a group of youths come and voluntarily clean the mosque, not just once but many times. Attracted by their apparent religious sincerity, the mosque board gives them an opportunity to issue the call to prayer, and eventually involves them as members of the board itself. These new members cleverly and conscientiously discharge their responsibilities, because in reality they’re extremist agents tasked with the job of seizing control of the mosque. As their position becomes increasingly powerful, they begin to invite other friends to join the board, and eventually control who may or may not serve as imam, deliver the Friday sermon, or provide religious education to attendees at the mosque. Slowly but surely, the mosque falls into the hands of radicals, until local religious leaders who once gave sermons and lectures at the mosque are denied the opportunity to teach Islam to their own congregations, and in fact lose control of the mosque and the local people, unless they prove willing to accept and promote the extremists’ ideology.

This case from Pati is only one of countless instances in which radicals have seized control of NU mosques. If this particular example were portrayed in film, viewers would likely assume it was merely the director’s wild imagination at work. But in fact, it is the logical manifestation of a virulent ideology, backed by immense funding, and operating in a systematic manner, as transnational Islamist movements and their local accomplices work nonstop to undermine and ultimately seize control of our nation. The research contained in this book demonstrates that the groups most often involved in the infiltration and seizure of NU mosques are the PKS and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

After realizing that many of its mosques and congregations had already been seized by extremist groups, the NU launched a campaign to consolidate and tighten the structure of its organization, both in mosques and other locations. The Nahdlatul Ulama’s central board firmly proclaimed that transnational Islamist movements such as al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood (represented in Indonesia by the PKS) and Hizb ut-Tahrir are dangerous political movements which threaten Sunni teachings and have the potential to destroy the nation.28 The radicals’ ability to dissimulate and pretend to accept NU teachings and tradition makes them even more dangerous, because this enables them to infiltrate anywhere, anytime. While in regard to the issue of a caliphate, the NU’s official forum for discussing Islamic law, the Majlis Bahtsul Masa’il, formally declared that there is no theological basis for an Islamic caliphate, either in the Qur’an or the hadith [the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad].29

Although in some places the NU has succeeded at reclaiming its mosques from extremists, the radical infiltration and capture of mosques and NU congregations continues to accelerate. As demonstrated by this study, in general the infiltration of extremists is far more dynamic than NU efforts to drive them out. If this situation is allowed to persist, it is very possible that the NU will lose a significant percentage of its mosques and followers, and itself be transformed into an organization that is less spiritual, and more extreme.

Radical infiltration of NU environs, and the failure of the world’s largest Muslim organization to halt extremist infiltration of Indonesia’s government, the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (MUI) and other strategic fields in general, is due in large part to the widespread phenomenon of “materialistic kyais,” or religious leaders.30 Materialistic kyais are more interested in their personal well-being than the interests of the NU’s followers or the nation as a whole. The forty million NU followers, who are concentrated in specific villages and districts, represent the largest single group of voters in Indonesia. Their votes can determine who is elected to regional or national legislatures, and who becomes a regent, governor or even president of Indonesia. This demographic reality tempts many political parties to manipulate the NU and exploit their relationships with materialistic kyais to achieve their own political interests. Because of human nature, there are kyais who long to receive cash-filled envelopes from political operatives, or elected office, and thus seek to fulfill their personal ambitions by acquiring a leadership position in the NU, whether at a local, regional or national level. Membership in the NU’s formal leadership structure thus serves as a bridge to exploiting, and being exploited by, certain political parties and politicians.

At the same time, many spiritual kyais have withdrawn from the above-mentioned arena of egotism and self-interest, and share their wisdom only with those who come, without self-interest, seeking God rather than worldly position. With a following of about 40 million, the NU—together with the Muhammadiyah—can truly serve as a pillar capable of supporting and maintaining Indonesia’s national integrity. However, in order to fulfill this vital role, the NU must conduct a spiritual revitalization and return to its highest values. In this manner, its ulama (religious scholars) may guide those in power, and not permit themselves to be manipulated or exploited in return. Our ancestors proclaimed such a relationship between spiritual and worldly leaders to be the path of dharma, and that is why wayang kulit always portrays kings acting not only with respect, but also obedience towards rishis, and not the reverse.31

These days, wayang culture—which is distinctly Indonesian and full of sublime values—is rapidly being shunted aside by foreign culture. The unwise adoption of foreign culture is causing the Indonesian people to lose their own identity as a nation. One example of this process may be glimpsed through an event that occurred in Cairo in the middle of 2004. A Nahdlatul Ulama Vice Chairman had been invited to deliver a paper to an international seminar on the topic of “Education and an Emancipatory Islamic Law-giving Body,” in conjunction with professors Hassan Hanafi and Youhanna Qaltah. One day before the paper was to be delivered, the President of the Egyptian chapter of the Association of Indonesian High School and University Students (PMII) and his companions barged into the Sonesta hotel, where the event was to be held, and demanded that the NU Vice Chairman withdraw from the event. They threatened that if he failed to do so, the students would take any step necessary to prevent him from delivering his paper, even to the point of murder. “If you go forward [and participate], I’ll kill you myself,” threatened Limra Zainuddin, the President of PPMI.32 Subsequent research revealed that the students in question were PK (PKS) activists in Cairo.33

As Muslims, those students were obliged to behave humbly (tawâdlu‘), respecting elders while acting with love and kindness towards those who are younger (laisa minnâ man lam yukrim kibâranâ wa lam yarham shighâranâ). However, this did not occur, because the students in question had neither understood nor internalized the teachings of Islam that are full of spirituality, and instead had already adopted a foreign culture, in a manner that was foolish and unwise. Both an immature grasp of Islam, and the adoption of Wahhabi/Muslim Brotherhood culture, can easily trap one in a narrow and rigid understanding of Islam. Anyone who lacks a profound understanding of Islam, especially those elements which concern ultimate Truth/Reality (haqiqa) and Gnosis (ma‘rifa, or mystical knowledge of, and union with, the Divine), will tend to think that what extremist groups proclaim is identical to that which is understood and believed by the majority of Muslims worldwide. Radicals employ the same language as Muslims in general, such as da‘wa (proselytism), amar ma’rûf nahy munkar (enjoining the good and forbidding evil) or Islam rahmatan lil-‘âlamîn (Islam as a blessing for all creation), but in reality they understand these terms differently.34

In their hands, amar ma’rûf nahy munkar becomes a formula for legitimizing compulsion, violence and attacks against anyone who differs from them. They excuse themselves by claiming to promote the good and forbid evil every time they commit such acts of violence or defame others. As for the concept of rahmatan lil-‘âlamîn: in the mouths of extremists, it becomes an excuse to formalize Islam; to force others to agree with their interpretation of Islam; and to accuse everyone who thinks differently, or rejects their interpretation, of rejecting the concept of rahmatan lil-‘âlamîn, as a prelude to finally branding them as infidels and apostates. And with regard to proselytism: the fundamental spirit of da‘wa is to provide information and to gently invite, for Islam guarantees freedom of religion (lâ ikrâh fi al-dîn).35 Here we see the fundamental contradiction between the activities of extremist groups and the teachings of Islam, which are full of love, tolerance and openness.

This use of a common religious language makes radicals extremely dangerous, because it enables them to easily deceive many Muslims and to infiltrate almost anywhere, anytime. Through this strategy, combined with militancy and strong financial support from abroad and within our country, extremist movements have deeply infiltrated most sectors of Indonesian society and are seeking to influence the majority of Muslims to follow their understanding of Islam. Until now, the Muslim community at large, and the government of Indonesia, have been deceived and/or permitted the activities of extremist movements, to the point that radical groups are increasingly large and powerful, and more and more easily force their agendas not only upon Islamic mass organizations but also upon the government, political parties, the mass media, the business world and educational institutions.

The militant behavior and truth claims asserted by radical groups often leaves the majority of Muslims, including opportunistic politicians, confused how to respond, because any rejection will be construed as opposing Islamic shari‘a, although in fact this is not the case.36 Thus it is not surprising that many government authorities and opportunistic political parties prefer to simply follow the dictates of extremist groups. One common example is the issuance of unconstitutional regional shari‘a regulations, which in fact are jurisprudential (fiqh) regulations that do not convey the true message or teachings of shari‘a itself. Their issuance is characterized by intolerance, and they violate both universal civil rights and the rights of religious minorities. Because they are derived from a jurisprudential understanding of Islam that is narrow and time-bound, they also fail to reflect the essence of religious teaching, which is full of spirituality, tolerance and love for all humanity.

In short, opportunistic politicians who work with extremist political parties or groups are also highly dangerous. They have joined the extremists in driving our nation towards a deep chasm, which threatens destruction and national disintegration. They care nothing about, and indeed, are actively engaged in sacrificing the future of our multi-religious and multi-ethnic nation. It appears that they place importance only upon their private political ambitions, in order to acquire wealth and power.

The hardline movement in Indonesia consists of various groups that support one another in achieving their common agenda, whether outside or within the institutions of government. Two extremely clear and present dangers are their persistent efforts to identify Islam with Wahhabi/Muslim Brotherhood ideology, and their attempt to annihilate our nation’s culture and traditions and replace them with foreign culture and traditions that reek of Wahhabism, but are claimed to represent the culture and traditions of Islam. Extremist success in either or both of these endeavors will place the Indonesian nation and its people beneath the thumb of the global Wahhabi/Muslim Brotherhood ideological network. And what is most disturbing about their activities, is the fact that radical movements have already succeeded in infiltrating to the heart of government institutions, and are using these to accomplish their goals.

Extremist agents have also infiltrated the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, or MUI), which knowledgeable observers have identified as a bunker of fundamenttalist and subversive movements.37 This quasi-governmental organization, which was established by Suharto’s New Order regime in order to control Indonesia’s Muslim community, has largely fallen into the grip of radicals, and is now dictating to, and in many ways controlling, the actions of government. Thus it is not surprising that fatwas originating with the MUI are counter-productive and provoke controversy, such as those banning secularism, pluralism and liberalism, and branding as deviant certain groups within society, thus provoking violent actions in the name of Islam.

Numerous acts of violence committed by radical groups such as the Front for the Defense of Islam (FPI)—which injure and destroy the property of those proclaimed “deviant” by the MUI—and the support by MUI’s leadership of those linked to such actions, confirms that the MUI is now playing a key role among extremist movements in Indonesia. At present, there is even a Hizb ut-Tahrir member of MUI, although Hizb ut-Tahrir explicitly aims to establish a global Islamic caliphate, which ideologically conflicts with Pancasila and necessarily entails the destruction of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

The low degree of attention and concern paid to the extremist phenomenon is not confined to radical ideology, movements and infiltration. The flow of Wahhabi money—which not only subsidizes terrorism, but also the spread of extremist ideology through global Wahhabization efforts—also goes largely unmentioned.38 Until now, the flow of Wahhabi money to Indonesia has not attracted serious public attention, although the phenomenon of extremist infiltration is backed by extraordinary financial support, to the point that radicalism has become a major business that delivers profit to many of its agents.

Some people are aware that huge amounts of Wahhabi petrodollars are flowing into Indonesia, but it’s difficult to prove the details in the field, because those who receive the funds in question are highly sensitive to this issue and generally refuse to speak about it. It appears that extremists refuse to discuss the issue of Wahhabi funding because they’re ashamed to have it known that they’ve made a business out of religion, and are serving Wahhabi goals, and also in order to conceal Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood infiltration of Indonesian Islam. On the other hand, Indonesian government authorities responsible for supervising the flow of funds in and out of the country also do not publicize this issue, although high-ranking officials responsible for state security privately admit that they are extremely concerned about this phenomenon.

To cite one example of Wahhabi funding, it has long been an open secret among experts that the Wahhabi proselytism group Rabita al-‘Alam al-Islami (the Muslim World League), financed by Saudi Arabia, directs large sums of money to radical movements in Indonesia, via Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the In donesian Council for Islamic Proselytism, or DDII).39 Numerous campus da‘wa activities conducted by the organization known as Lembaga Dakwa Kampus (the Institute for Campus Proselytism, or LDK)—which gave birth to the Tarbiyah movement, which in turn gave birth to the political party PKS—enjoy Saudi funding, and have been responsible for spreading the Tarbiyah virus throughout Indonesia.

In Central Java, one of our researchers obtained information from a former Muhammadiyah executive from a local sub-regency in Magelang that PKS was currently seeking mosques that needed renovation, and villages that needed new mosques. The PKS activist responsible for this project openly admitted to the former Muhammadiyah executive that all the funding for this project came from Saudi Arabia. If a mosque was to be built or renovated, the local inhabitants were merely requested to support the PKS electorally. According to the activist, “In 2008, 11 mosques are already scheduled for renovation or construction with Saudi money” in Magelang Regency alone. Nearly all the mosques in Magelang that are infiltrated by the PKS using this strategy are attended by NU followers.40 If the Saudis and PKS are working on 11 mosques in one regency alone (out of more than 400 regencies in Indonesia), imagine how much Wahhabi money is going to build mosques in all of Indonesia, motivated by political calculations!

After a PKS candidate unexpectedly triumphed in the West Java gubernatorial election in July of 2008, a Nahdlatul Ulama vice chairman informed our researchers that this victory was marked by PKS success in capturing numerous NU mosques and their congregations. Although the NU vice chairman was shocked by this occurrence, the PKS success in capturing NU mosques and congregations should not surprise anyone. A virulent ideology—supported by vast sums of foreign money, deployed in a systematic manner—can infiltrate nearly anywhere, and overcome disorganized opposition. In other words, as ulama often state: al-haqq bi lâ nizhâm tughlab al-bâthil bi al-nizhâm (truth which is not organized may be readily defeated by evil that is).

Extremist agents often shout that foreigners, including Western foundations and governments, employ their money to destroy Islam in Indonesia, and hurl accusations that a Zionist/Christian conspiracy lurks behind such efforts. In reality, Western governments and foundations such as Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation openly publicize the programs they conduct, so that the public may know what they are actually doing, and how much money they’re spending on the projects in question.41 Although LibForAll Foundation’s funding is extremely small, and the majority of its board members, advisors and management are native Indonesians, it too reports its programs in an open and transparent manner.

This is completely different from foreign Wahhabi/Muslim Brotherhood movements and their various accomplices in Indonesia. The research contained in this book clearly demonstrates that while extremists scream that foreigners are coming to Indonesia with vast sums of money to destroy Islam…. of course that is true, because the foreigners are activists from transnational movements from the Middle East, who spend fantastic sums of petrodollars to Wahhabize and destroy an Indonesian Islam that is polite, tolerant and spiritual, and to transform Indonesia in accordance with their utopian dream of an ideal Islamic state which does not exist anywhere in the world, including the Middle East.42

Wrapped in Arab-looking turbans, baggy white robes and beards, which several Indonesian figures have described as the garb of robed thugs, they wish to convince others that the extremist views they scream at the top of their lungs and try to force on everyone else represent the true message of Islam, for which all must struggle. Yet in reality they are damaging the religion of Islam, and are responsible for countless acts of violence which they and their allies have committed in the name of Islam, both in Indonesia and throughout the world. And the rest of us, as Muslims, should be deeply ashamed of their actions.

The primary reason we must oppose hardline movements is to restore honor and respect to Islam, which the extremists have desecrated, while at the same time preserving Pancasila and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Victory in the struggle against extremists will restore the majesty of Islamic teachings as rahmatan lil-‘âlamîn—a blessing for all creation—and this represents a vital key to building a peaceful world.

We have conducted and published this study in order to raise awareness among all components of Indonesian society, particularly the elite and mass media, concerning the dangers of extremist ideology and doctrine with which Middle Eastern transnational movements are flooding our nation, and which have sprouted like mushrooms in the rainy season over the past decade, during our democratic era. This work is also intended as a call to defend and preserve Pancasila, which reflects the essence of shari‘a and transforms Islam into a true blessing for all creation.

In chapter five, this study recommends a number of strategic steps to guard and preserve Pancasila, the Basic Constitution of 1945 and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and our nation’s glorious cultural and spiritual heritage and traditions. These strategic steps include:

• Encourage and inspire the public, including Indonesia’s elites, to be open-minded, humble and devoted to constant learning, so that they may comprehend the spirituality and essence of religious teachings, and thus become tranquil souls.

• Halt in its tracks and eliminate—using responsible meth ods—the vicious cycle of radicalization that spreads extrem ist ideology and doctrine, by promoting enlightened education (in the broadest sense of the term), and by teaching and practicing the sublime commands of Islam, which foster an awareness of the need to become a humble, tolerant and peaceful servant of God.

Working together, while reminding each other of the truth (wa tawâshau bil-haqq) and always being patient (wa tawâshau bilshabr), are vital keys in this endeavor. We must be polite, tolerant, open-minded and transparent in our efforts to preserve the glorious vision of our ancestors and founding fathers. A noble purpose should not be disgraced by the use of unethical methods, hatred towards others or harsh actions. Exalted goals must be accomplished using methods that are truthful, sincere, resolute, wise and responsible, without the slightest admixture of arrogance, compulsion or the like.

In this context, it’s appropriate that we recall Shaykh Ibn ‘Ataillah al-Iskandari’s advice, from his opus Hikam: “Do not closely associate with anyone whose spiritual state does not inspire you, and whose speech does not lead you to God” (lâ tash-hab man lâ yunhid luka ilâ Allah hâluhu, wa la yahdîka ilâ Allâh maqâluhu). People who are convinced that they know more than anyone else about Islam, and yet are full of hatred towards any of God’s creatures who do not travel the same path as they; and those who claim themselves to be in possession of the absolute truth, and for that reason entitled to act as God’s vice-regents on earth (caliphs) and to dictate how everyone else must live—clearly, their words and behavior will not lead us into the presence of God. Their dream of an Islamic state is merely an illusion, for the true Islamic state is not to be found in the structure of any government, but rather, in hearts which are open to God and all His creatures.

Truth and falsehood are abundantly clear. Extremists wish to compel the entire Indonesian people to prostrate before their extreme and rigid doctrines concerning Islam. The history of our nation—including the Babad Tanah Jawi, the Padri War, the Darul Islam rebellion and other such bloody eruptions—clearly demonstrates that restless, discontented souls will constantly shove our nation towards the brink of destruction until they succeed in acquiring total power, or we stop them, as earlier generations of tranquil souls—i.e., our ancestors—have done so many times before. Now it is we who must decide the fate of our nation.

Jakarta, 8 March 2009

  1. This hadith (saying of the Prophet Muhammad) is extremely popular among traditional ulama (religious scholars) and Sufis, although various parties regard it as weak (dlâ‘if), and members of the Wahhabi sect reject it altogether. In terms of its line of transmission (riwâyah), this hadith is indeed regarded as weak. But in terms of its meaning and content (dirâyah), it is consistent with Islam’s highest teachings regarding jihad. This is clear from other hadith which differ slightly in terms of redaction, but are consistent with the above-quoted hadith’s message in terms of meaning (ma‘nâwî), such as those conveyed by Ahmad ibn Hanbal in hadith numbers 24678, 24692 and 24465, “Al-Mujâhid man jâhada nafsahu li-Llâh atau fi Allâh ‘azz wa jall” (“A mujahid (holy warrior) is one who wages jihad against himself for the sake of Allah,” or, in a different version, “in (the path which leads to) God the Most Noble and Great”) [read in: Abu ‘Abdillah Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal, Masnad Ahmad, (Cairo: Mauqi‘ Wizârat al-Auqâf al Mishriyyah, undated)]. One may also consult a hadith found in Fath al-Qadîr by al-Syaukânî, “Al-Mujâhid man jâhada nafsah fî thâ‘at Allâh” (A mujahid is one who wages jihad against himself, in order to be obedient to God), conveyed by Ibn Jarîr and confirmed by al-Hakim as being valid; conveyed also by Ibn Mardawaih from ‘Aisyah [al-Syukânî, Fath al-Qadîr (Cairo: Mauqi‘ al-Tafâsir, undated), Vol. 5, p. 142]. An important point to stress in this context is that jihad greatly emphasizes efforts to control and subdue one’s own carnal nature, in the form of ego and its attendant lusts. Al-Razy, for example, even states that jihad in the context of war (qitâl) must first and foremost be preceded by victory over oneself, so as not to engage in the actions of a hypocrite, or one who seeks praise, glory, profit or other benefits for himself. All must be conducted in a completely self less manner, after having tamed oneself, so that one’s actions are not dictated by egotism or personal desire (read in: Fakhruddin al-Râzî, Mafâtih al-Ghaib (Cairo: Mauqi‘ al-Tafâsir, undated), vol. 7, p. 474). In summary, the hadith Raja‘na min jihâd al-ashghar ilâ jihâd al-akbar (“We have returned from the lesser to the greater jihad”) is accepted by traditional ulama and Sufis because, in terms of meaning and content, it is consistent with other hadith which are fully valid in terms of their transmission.
  2. “Experts on Qur’anic exegesis say that a polytheist is one who performs ritual worship, or gives charity, for reasons other than devotion to God. Thus the verse, ‘Wa lam yusyrik bi ‘ibâdati Rabbihi ahada’ (‘and does not associate anything whatsoever in worship of his God’). For example, if one says that he is fighting for Islam, but in reality, his motivation is selfish and egotistical, then he has already associated (himself) with God.” “Don’t be trapped by worldly temptations, or the sparkle of material existence; for example, the flattery of women. Don’t be tempted by status or power and become arrogant, forgetting yourself…. Don’t allow yourself to be entrapped by snares that give the appearance of devotion to God, humanity or jihad (“strenuous effort on the Divine path”), when in reality they’re not. These are snares that truly mire us (in forgetfulness of God) and doom us (to separation from God). For example, arrogance may emerge after one has already become a (religious) leader, giving countless sermons to wide applause, and with people everywhere respecting you. The snares of ego and self-importance mire us (in forgetfulness of God), and those who fall prey to this are called, in Arabic, hidden polytheists.” “The antidote to polytheism is self-transcendence. A polytheist is one who is not self-transcendent; who is motivated by ego and self-interest, or the interests of his group, rather than engaging in actions moment by moment (guided by and) purely for the sake of the Divine.” (In sequence, statements by Prof. Dr. Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Prof. Dr. Kyai Haji Said Aqil Siraj, and Kyai Haji Masdar F. Mas‘udi in: Ocean of Revelations: Understanding Islam as a Blessing for All Creation, Episode 4: “People of Faith,” Program Supervisor: Kyai Haji Mustofa Bisri, ©LibForAll Foundation 2009).
  3. [Translator’s note: As in India, the Mahabarata and Ramayana represent two of the great national epics of Java, and are deeply embedded in Javanese and Indonesian awareness. The Mahabarata tells of the struggle between two sets of cousins, the Pandavas and Kuravas, who represent the forces of dharma (virtue or right action, which arises from spiritual awareness) and adharma (lack of virtue or sinful action, which arises from egotism and lust).]
  4. [Translator’s note: Indonesia’s state motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, literally means, “(Although) different, yet simultaneously One.” Emerging from Java’s Hindu-Buddhist past, the phrase references not only social and political unity amid diversity, but also a spiritual apprehension regarding the Unicity of Being, or the emergence of all creation from a Divine Source from which it is inseparable, and to which it shall inevitably return (as individual waves arise from, and return to, the ocean). This principle is also a key tenet of Sufism, or Islamic mysticism. The Old Javanese verse by Mpu Tantular in which this phrase appears, reads as follows: “The diverse forms of the universe are expressions of the One Buddha/Shiva; They are indeed different (bhinneki), yet it is impossible to perceive them as fundamentally different, when one apprehends the underlying Unity of existence; for the Truth of Buddha and the Truth of Shiva is One (tunggal); (the diverse forms of the universe) are indeed different, yet simultaneously One (bhinneka tunggal ika).”]
  5. [Translator’s note: Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid was directly descended from both the last Hindu-Buddhist kings of Java, and from Sunan Kalijogo and Sultan Adiwijoyo. The story of their successful efforts to preserve a pluralistic, tolerant and spiritual understanding of religion in the face of radical Muslim attempts to annihilate indigenous Javanese culture (in the 16th century) is told in the national epic, Babad Tanah Jawi, or History of the Land of Java.]
  6. The seed of awareness of Indonesian nationalism is generally traced to 20 May 1908 with the establishment of Boedi Oetomo, the first indigenous political society in the Dutch East Indies.
  7. [Translator’s note: Kyai Haji Hasjim Asy’ari (the grandfather of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid) founded the Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926, in order to stimulate a spiritual awakening among ulama, and defend traditional Sunni Muslim teachings in the face of contemporary developments, including the Wahhabi conquest of Mecca and Medina and the spread of extremist ideology, which rejects Sufism (Islamic spirituality) and the accommodation of local cultural practices. The Nahdlatul Ulama, or NU, has since grown to become the largest Muslim organization in the world.]
  8. [Translator’s note: Pancasila is the official philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. Pancasila consists of two Sanskrit words, “panca,” meaning five, and “sila,” meaning principle(s). It comprises five principles held to be inseparable and interrelated: belief in the one and only God; a just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by inner wisdom, and arising out of deliberations by elected representatives; and social justice for all the people of Indonesia. In adopting the term pancasila to describe the newly-independent state of Indonesia’s official ideology, the nation’s primarily Muslim founders established a conscious link with the past. In Buddhism, pancasila (the Five Precepts) refers to the basic Buddhist code of ethics, undertaken by lay followers of Gautama Buddha in the Theravada and Mahayana traditions. The Five Precepts are commitments to abstain from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying and intoxication. They are not formulated as imperatives, but as training rules that lay people undertake voluntarily to facilitate practice on the path to spiritual liberation.]
  9. [Translator’s note: From 1949 – 1962, the Darul Islam guerilla movement waged an armed struggle to overthrow the Indonesian state and replace it with a theocratic Islamic state, based upon a fundamentalist understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Offshoots of the Darul Islam rebellion include the contemporary terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which has been responsible for dozens of bombings in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto, including the notorious attack in Bali that killed over 200 in October of 2002, and led to the establishment of LibForAll Foundation.]
  10. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Atas Nama Tuhan: dari Fikih Otoriter ke Fikih Otoritatif (In the Name of God: From Authoritarian Islamic Jurisprudence to Authoritative Islamic Jurisprudence), translated from Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (Jakarta: Serambi, 2003), p. 48.
  11. [Translator’s note: The terms “hardliner,” “extremist” and “radical” are used interchangeably in this book. In Indonesia, the term “hardliner” (garis keras) has a derogative connotation, describing someone who has a coarse and superficial understanding of Islam, as opposed to a deep and nuanced understanding based upon wisdom and experience.]
  12. For instance, read the Wahid Institute’s 2008 annual report on Religious Pluralism in Indonesia, “Contemplating a Nation that is Increasingly Fractured” (Pluralisme Beragama/Berkeyakinan di Indonesia, “Menapaki Bangsa yang Kian Retak”).
  13. [Translator’s note: Extremists often make a show of their supposed devoutness, employing religious symbols such as beards and so-called “Muslim” clothing (long, white shirts or robes for men), quoting the Qur’an, ostentatiously praying and fasting, etc., in order to appear “Islamic” and thereby don a mantle of religious authority.]
  14. [Translator’s note: The Khawârij, or Kharijites, were an early Islamic splinter group that sought to annihilate everyone who did not agree with their views. The most notorious of their terrorist acts was the assassination of the fourth Caliph, the Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law, ‘Ali.]
  15. “Furthermore, there are those who understand faith in a monopolistic fashion, so that anyone whose understanding is different from theirs, is considered unfaithful. In reality this is an old phenomenon, not just contemporary. At the time of Sayadina Ali, may God give him honor and praise, there was a group called the Khawârij who denounced everyone outside their narrow sect as infidels. This phenomenon has now reincarnated once again, to the point where someone like (the terrorist) Azhari comes to Indonesia setting off bombs and imagines that he’ll be rewarded in heaven for such actions.” ~ Kyai Haji Hasyim Muzadi, Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board, in Ocean of Revelations: Understanding Islam as a Blessing for All Creation, Episode 3: “Faith Communities,” Program Supervisor: Kyai Haji A. Mustofa Bisri, ©LibForAll Foundation 2009).
  16. [Translator’s note: The Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, or PKS) is an Indonesian political party inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, while Hizb ut-Tahrir is a subversive organization that seeks to establish a global caliphate. For more on both organizations, see Chapter II, “The Origins and Global Spread of Wahhabi/Muslim Brotherhood Ideology.”]
  17. Read Bret Stephens, “The Exorcist: Indonesian man seeks to create an Islam that will make people smile,” at http://www.libforall.org/news-WSJ-the-exorcist. html.
  18. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, “Sendang Ayu: Pergulatan Muhammadiyah di Kaki Bukit Barisan,” (“Sendang Ayu: Muhammadiyah Battle at the Foot of Barisan Mountain,”) Suara Muhammadiyah, 2 January 2006.
  19. Farid Setiawan, “Ahmad Dahlan Menangis (Tanggapan terhadap Tulisan Ab dul Munir Mulkhan),” Suara Muhammadiyah, 20 February 2006.
  20. Ibid.
  21. “At the time of its birth in the 1970s and ‘80s, the Tarbiyah movement was a campus proselytism movement that used the Tarbiyah system of education employed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This militant group represented a new direction, as an ideological Islamic movement, that was entirely different from the major streams of Indonesian Islam represented by the Muham madiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama, which are moderate and culturally-oriented Islamic movements. Activists from the Tarbiyah movement established the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, or PK) in 1998, which changed its name to become the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) in 2004. The PKS established Tarbiyah a la the Muslim Brotherhood as a system for the education and recruitment of its party members. Thus, the Tarbiyah movement cannot be divorced from the PK/PKS, as both derive the breath of their ideological inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood, while Tarbiyah serves as the medium/vital instrument of the PKS, which is famed for combining da‘wa (proselytism) and politics.” (from the back cover of Haedar Nashir’s book, Manifestations of the Tarbiyah Movement: How Should the Muhammadiyah Respond?, 5th printing, Yogyakarta: Suara Muham madiyah, 2007).
  22. Farid Setiawan, “Tiga Upaya Mu‘allimin dan Mu‘allimat,” Suara Muhammadiyah, 3 April 2006.
  23. Ibid.
  24. Haedar Nashir, Manifestasi Gerakan Tarbiyah: Bagaimana Sikap Muhammadi yah? 5th printing (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2007).
  25. Muhammadiyah Central Board Decree Number 149/Kep/I.0/B/2006. To read the full text of the decree, see Appendix 1.
  26. Ibid, Haedar Nashir, p. 66.
  27. Sadanand Dhume, “Indonesian Democracy’s Enemy Within: Radical Islamic party threatens Indonesia with ballots more than bullets,” in the Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2005.
  28. The NU Central Board has pressed Indonesia’s government to halt the infiltration of transnational ideology. Much earlier, the respected NU leader Kyai Haji Yusuf Hasjim asked the NU Central Board to cut off the flow of transnational ideology because of its danger to the NU and to Indonesia itself. (Memorial speech delivered 100 days after the death of KH. Yusuf Hasjim in Jombang, East Java; see NU Online, “PBNU Desak Pemerintah Cegah Ideologi Transnasi onal,” Ahad, 29 April 2007, which appears in Appendix 2 of this book).
  29. See Appendix 2 of this book.
  30. [Translator’s note: The original etymological meaning of the Javanese term kyai was “lord,” referring to nobles, aristocrats and/or landed gentry who exerted political, military, economic and religious authority in a specific region. During the Dutch colonial era, the military and political aspects of this authority waned, and the term kyai evolved to refer specifically to Muslim leaders who exert religious authority within a given geographic region. The term is in many ways similar to the Arabic “shaykh,” which can refer either to a tribal leader/elder, or to a religious figure. Historically, the top leadership of the Nahdlatul Ulama consisted of kyais who were descended from Javanese nobility, but increasingly this is no longer the case.]
  31. [Translator’s note: Prior to the spread of television, wayang kulit, or shadow puppet performances, were the most popular form of public entertainment in Java. The extensive repertory of wayang kulit tales—which are primarily derived from the ancient Hindu epics the Ramayana and Mahabharata—seek to educate viewers about the nature of good and evil, and life’s ultimate Truth. Kings and rishis (enlightened sages) appear in most wayang kulit performances, with the latter imparting the knowledge required for good governance, and spiritual libera tion, to the former.]
  32. See “Gertak Mati Pengawal Akidah (Threatening to Murder in the Name of Islamic Morality)” in Gatra, edition 14, published on 13 February 2004.
  33. Interview with an Indonesian alumnus of al-Azhar University in Cairo, who began his study at al-Azhar in the year 2000.
  34. “Because ideological movements are often neither felt nor recognized by those who are infiltrated by them, they can systematically penetrate organizations and grow quite large. All the more so when the ideological movements in question convey a puritanical and militant Islamic ideology, so that whoever views them as problematic will himself be accused of causing problems. To oppose them means to be Islamophobic, or opposed to religious unity. In this way such ideological movements become ever more deeply rooted and expand systematically, until by the time they are finally recognized as a serious problem, it’s too late and they can no longer be halted or controlled, because they have already developed a mass base of followers. Ideological movements’ mode of infiltration is truly broad and systematic, something which is seldom realized by most people.” (Haedar Nashir, Manifestasi Gerakan Tarbiyah: Bagaimana Sikap Muhammadiyah? Fifth printing [Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2007], p. 59).
  35. “The proper role of government, concerning (extremists’ use of force and calling it) da‘wa is to have the ulama and intellectuals advise and correct those who are wrong. If (the extremists) fail to immediately accept this advice, the government must enforce the law by arresting and sentencing them to prison, in accordance with their wrongdoing.” ~ The Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, in Ocean of Revelations: Understanding Islam as a Blessing for All Creation, Episode 5: “Da‘wa” (“Proselytism,”) Program Supervisor: KH. A. Mustofa Bisri, ©LibForAll Foundation 2009).
  36. [Translator’s note: for a detailed discussion of shari‘a, see Chapter III of this book (“The Ideology and Agenda of Extremist Movements in Indonesia”), especially the section entitled “Prefatory Remarks.”]
  37. See “MUI Bunker Islam Radikal,” posted on the Wahid Institute’s website at http://www.wahidinstitute.org/Program/Detail/?id=47/hl=id/MUI_Bun ker_Islam_Radikal.
  38. In his book The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and its Role in Terrorism, Stephen Sulaiman Schwartz clearly and convincingly describes the flow of Wahhabi money to finance global Wahhabization efforts and acts of international terrorism committed in the name of Islam. During the Balkan conflict, for example, Wahhabis used the pretext of defending Bosnian Muslims from ethnic cleansing, to spread their ideology by building infrastructure for education and worship. The Wahhabis specifically employ education (tarbiyah) and worship (ubûdiyah) as ideological camouflage to spread their narrow and rigid understanding of religion. While in the case of the World Trade Center, it is already clear who was the mastermind behind that tragedy. (Stephen Sulaiman Schwartz (2002). The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Ter rorism. New York: Doubleday. Published in Indonesian as: Dua Wajah Islam: Mod eratisme vs Fundamentalisme dalam Wacana Global. Jakarta: LibForAll Foundation, the Wahid Institute, the Center for Islamic Pluralism, and Blantika.)
  39. Noorhaidi Hasan, “Islamic Militancy, Sharia, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Soeharto Indonesia,” Working Paper No. 143, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore, 23 October 2007).
  40. Research interview conducted in Magelang Regency in August, 2008.
  41. The United States government heavily funds training to build human resources capacity in conjunction with democracy, throughout the developing world. The National Democratic Institute, a quasi-governmental institute from the United States that seeks to promote democracy in Indonesia, “typically works with parties from across the ideological spectrum to foster a genuine multiparty political system. However, in most countries, resource limitations and other considerations prevent the Institute from working with all registered political parties. In such cases, the Institute typically selects its partners based on their commitment to democratic principles and non-violence rather than by their political beliefs. In addition, as appropriate, NDI considers objective criteria such as: political viability and base of popular support, as evidenced by legitimate election results; level of grassroots organization; [and] the ability to absorb assistance…. NDI continues to support reform efforts within Indonesia’s major political parties. In response to issues parties face—such as training of activists and members, direct election campaigns, policy development, leadership selection, analysis of voter attitudes and political party development and reform—NDI continues to provide comparative global expert advice, information, and skills-building training to party leaders and instructors at national, provincial, and local levels.” (See: http://www.ndi.org/indonesia). Interviews with key NDI officials in March of 2008 indicate that the party which most actively participates in, and benefits from, the NDI’s Political Party Development program in Indonesia is the PKS.
  42. Saudi activities in Indonesia represent only a small fraction of a more than US$70 billion campaign (from 1979 to 2003, and still rising) to spread the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect throughout the world. These constantly intensifying Wahhabi proselytization efforts constitute “the largest worldwide propaganda campaign ever mounted—dwarfing the Soviets’ propaganda efforts at the height of the Cold War.” (See: “How Billions in Oil Money Spawned a Global Terror Network,” in US News & World Report, 7 December 2003).